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NOTE
THE USE OF QUI TAM ACTIONS TO ENFORCE FEDERAL
GRAZING PERMITS
I. INTRODUCTION
The single greatest ecological threat to federally owned rangelands is
overgrazing by sheep and cattle.' This is due, in large part, to the inability
of federal agencies to effectively administer the lands and prevent these
abuses.2 This Note proposes the use of qui tam actions under the False
Claims Ace against ranchers who graze in violation of federally granted
permits. Qui tam provisions allow citizens to bring suit to prosecute frauds
against the government.4 In certain circumstances, ranchers who graze
sheep and cattle in violation of federal permits are defrauding the
government.5 Permitting False Claims Act qui tam actions against grazing
permit violators would allow environmentally concerned citizens and
organizations to enforce grazing permits in circumstances where the federal
government is either unwilling or unable to enforce them itself.6
While most of the deterioration of public rangelands occurred before the
federal government regulated the use of such lands,7 their condition has
improved only slightly since Congress first provided for rangeland
regulation in 1934.' Overgrazing by privately owned cattle, both in
accordance with and in violation of federal law, appears to be principally
1. George C. Coggins et al., T7e Law of Public Rangeland Management I: The Extent and
Distribution of Federal Power, 12 EmNL. L. 535, 539 & n.21 (1982) [hereinafter Coggins I].
2. See discussion infra Part II.B.
3. 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3733 (1988).
4. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b) (1988).
5. See discussion infra Part IV.A.
6. Several environmental groups, particularly the Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC),
have shown interest in litigating issues in this area. See, e.g., NRDC v. Hodel, 618 F. Supp. 848 (E.D.
Cal. 1985); NRDC v. Morton, 388 F. Supp. 829 (D.D.C. 1974), affd, 527 F.2d 1386 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denicd, 427 U.S. 913 (1976). See also Joseph M. Feller, Grazing Management on the Public Lands:
Opening the Process to Public Participation, 26 LAND & WATER L. REV. 571, 573 (1991).
7. Coggins I, supra note 1, at 547 n.75 (referring to the use of western lands for grazing in the
nineteenth century as an example of Hardin's "tragedy of the commons"). See also infra notes 79-80,
86.
8. See infra notes 79-85 and accompanying text.
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responsible for this limited recovery.9
The Bureau of Land Management (BLM)'0 is the primary federal
agency charged with overseeing the lands available for public grazing. The
BLM currently manages nearly 170 million acres of public rangeland."
However, critics have denounced the BLM for its failure to prevent
overgrazing on these lands. 2
Several factors contribute to the overgrazing problem: the influence of
ranchers on government rangeland decisionmaking; 3 the lack of funding
of agencies which administer the lands; 4 the limited information on which
BLM decisions are based;'5 and the lack of public participation in
rangeland management decisionmaking. 6 In some areas, steps are being
taken to confront these problems. For example, the Clinton administration
has proposed regulations to increase grazing fees and to add biologists and
environmentalists to local advisory boards, which were previously
dominated by ranchers.'7 Environmental groups succeeded in an early suit
to require National Environmental Protection Act impact statements for
government regulation of public lands. 8 More recently, these groups won
an administrative determination that grazing permit or lease approvals and
renewals are "actions" for the purposes of BLM regulations implementing
the Federal Lands Protection and Management Act (FLPMA). 9 Conse-
quently, whenever a grazing permit or a lease is approved or renewed,
public rangeland administrators must notify affected parties, provide a
9. See infra notes 86-87 and accompanying text.
10. This Note is limited in scope to a discussion of problems associated with the BLM's
management of public rangeland. However, the Forest Service also manages a substantial amount of
rangeland under a similar statutory schema. See CELIA CAMPBELL-MOHN ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL
LAW FROM RESOURCES TO RECOVERY 346 (1993). Generally, comments in this Note should also be
applicable to the Forest Service, although its rangeland management programs have not been criticized
as extensively as have the BLM's. GEORGE C. COGGINS, PUBLIC NATURAL RESOURCES LAW § 19.01,
at 19-2 (1991) [hereinafter PNRL]. But see U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, FOREST SERVICE NOT
PERFORMING NEEDED MONITORING OF GRAZING ALLOTMENTS (1991).
11. See infra note 27 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 88-99 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 88-91 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 95-96 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 93-94 and accompanying text.
16. See infra note 92 and accompanying text.
17. 58 Fed. Reg. 43,230 (proposed Aug. 13, 1993) (to be codified at 43 C.F.R. § 1784.6-4). See
generally 58 Fed. Reg. 43,208-231 (1993).
18. NRDC v. Morton, 388 F. Supp. 829 (D.D.C. 1974), aff'd, 527 F.2d 1386 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 427 U.S. 913 (1976).
19. Feller, supra note 6, at 573 n.l 1 (citing Joseph M. Feller, No. UT-06-89-02 (U.S. Dep't of the
Interior, Aug. 13, 1990)).
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statement of reasons for their action, and allow an opportunity for
administrative protest and appeal.2" These changes will help resolve the
problems associated with rancher influence, lack of information, and lack
of public participation discussed above.
The problem of agency underfunding, and corresponding understaffing,
seems more resistant to solution, however. Given current budget reali-
ties,2 ' it seems unlikely that the administrative agencies charged with
monitoring ranchers who use federal rangelands can expect adequate
resources to enforce federal permits. Empowering private citizens to bring
actions against violators on behalf of the federal government represents a
potential solution to the problem of underenforcement of federal grazing
permits. Actions brought in this manner are known as qui tam actions.22
By using this private prosecution power, environmentally concerned
individuals or groups can take a role in the prevention of range overgraz-
ing.
The False Claims Act empowers both the Justice Department and private
citizens to bring actions against persons who assert fraudulent claims
against the government.2 3 It provides for the recovery of civil penalties
of up to $10,000 per violation and treble damages arising from such
claims.24 Private citizens who bring these qui tam actions can collect ten
to thirty percent of the damages recovered from the violator, as well as
attorney fees.25 Therefore, if the False Claims Act were applicable in the
federal rangeland context, it would provide incentive for citizens to aid the
government in the prevention of illegal overgrazing by privately enforcing
grazing limits in rangeland permits and leases.
This Note argues that ranchers assert fraudulent claims against the
government, and thus violate the False Claims Act, whenever: (1) they
renew their permits or leases while in violation of their current permit
restrictions; or (2) they receive or renew leases or permits for federal
rangeland with the intent to violate the lease restrictions. Part II of this
Note provides an overview of the administration of federal rangeland and
summarizes the problems of overgrazing. Part III discusses the require-
ments of qui tam actions under the False Claims Act. Part IV applies the
False Claims Act to the problem of unlawful overgrazing.
20. Id.
21. See infra note 101.
22. See infra notes 102-05 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 107-08 and accompanying text.
24. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a) (1988).
25. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d) (1988).
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II. BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT ADMINISTRATION OF PUBLIC
RANGELANDS
In order to understand how the False Claims Act may be used against
range permit violators, it is necessary to provide a brief overview of the
statutory scheme under which rangeland grazing is regulated, to examine
the interests that ranchers hold in their grazing permits, and to characterize
the benefit that ranchers receive from a grazing permit. Part II.A. covers
these areas. It is also necessary to explain why current approaches to
rangeland enforcement are not adequate. Part II.B. describes the ecologi-
cally detrimental effects of overgrazing, and shows why BLM is unable to
deal effectively with the problem.
A. The Statutory and Regulatory Framework
The framework under which the BLM administers the federal rangelands
grants ranchers specific property rights in the lands they use. Because
federal grazing rights are worth more than ranchers pay the government,
these grazing permits also constitute a ranching subsidy. The presence of
these characteristics in the federal grazing program creates the potential for
application of the False Claims Act.
Federal rangelands are administered under a panoply of statutes. 26 The
most important statute for grazing regulation is the Taylor Grazing Act of
1934 (Taylor Act).27 Under the Taylor Act, the BLM administers almost
160 million acres of public rangeland, most of which is located in eleven
western states.28 The rangelands, which are left over from various federal
26. The Bureau of Land Management is governed by, inter alia, the Taylor Grazing Act of 1934,
43 U.S.C. §§ 315-315r (1988); the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976, 43 U.S.C. §§
1701-1784 (1988); and the Public Rangelands Improvement Act of 1978, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1908
(1988). The Forest Service's rangeland program is governed by, in addition to the above statutes, the
1897 Organic Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 473-483, 551 (1988); the National Forest Grazing Act, 16 U.S.C. §§
580c-5801 (1988); and the Multiple-Use, Sustained-Yield Act of 1960, 16 U.S.C. §§ 528-531 (1988).
In addition, limited livestock grazing is authorized in some parts of the national parks, 16 U.S.C. §
410mm-l(e) (1988), wildlife refuges, 16 U.S.C. § 668dd(1)(A) (1988), and wilderness systems, 16
U.S.C. § 1133(d)(4) (1988).
27. 43 U.S.C. §§ 315-315r (1988) (originally enacted as Act of June 28, 1934, ch. 865, § 1, 48
Stat. 1269).
28. BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT, U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, PUBLIc LAND STATISTICS
1990, at 26 (1991) [hereinafter PUBLIC LAND STATISTICS]. Under the authority of other statutes, the
BLM administers another 5.7 million acres. Id. at 27.
The vast majority of BLM lands are located in the following eleven western states: Arizona,
California, Colorado, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, Oregon, Utah, Washington, and Wyoming.
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land distributions during the nineteenth century,29 generally are found in
intermountain and desert areas and are unsuitable for farming.3" The
lands are used for grazing because they contain nourishing forage for cattle
and are suitable for the "Spanish-style" ranching that has historically
dominated the West." Rangelands controlled by the BLM also serve
other public purposes, including recreation, mining, and research.32
The rangelands are divided into individual grazing allotments.33 The
BLM authorizes use of these allotments by issuing a permit for a period of
up to ten years.34 In addition, other more isolated tracts of land may be
"leased" for grazing." At a minimum,36 grazing permits and leases must
George C. Coggins & Margaret Lindeberg-Johnson, The Law of Public Rangeland Management II: The
Commons and the Taylor Act, 13 ENvTL. L. 1, 5 (1982) [hereinafter Coggins II].
29. A variety of nineteenth century statutes granted federal land to various parties including states,
railroads, miners, and homesteaders. See Coggins II, supra note 28, at 4-22.
30. Coggins I, supra note 1, at 536.
31. Coggins II, supra note 28, at 22. "Spanish-style" ranchers allow their cattle herds to roam
unherded for months. Early western ranchers adopted the method because it was relatively
inexpensive-there was no need to build fences or pay herders-and the low population density of the
early West reduced or eliminated the need to tightly control herds. Id.
32. PUBLIC LAND STATISTICS, supra note 28, at 50-52, 56-58, 62-90. Under FLPMA, the
Secretary of the Interior must manage federal lands "under principles of multiple use and sustained
yield." 43 U.S.C. § 1732(a) (1988). Multiple use is defined as:
[T]he management of the public lands and their various resource values so that they are
utilized in the combination that will best meet the present and future needs of the American
people; ... a combination of balanced and diverse resource uses that takes into account the
long term needs of future generations for renewable and nonrenewable resources, including,
but not limited to, recreation, range, timber, minerals, watershed, wildlife and fish, and natural
scenic, scientific, and historical values ....
43 U.S.C. § 1702(c) (1988). Sustained yield means "the achievement and maintenance in perpetuity
of a high-level annual or regular periodic output of the various renewable resources of the public lands
consistent with multiple use." 43 U.S.C. § 1702(h) (1988).
33. Feller, supra note 6, at 573.
34. 43 U.S.C. § 315b (1988); 43 C.F.R. § 4130.2(c) (1991).
35. 43 U.S.C. § 315m (1988). Despite this limited leasing authority, the grazing permit is the far
more important device for distributing grazing rights. In 1990, 12,153 operators held grazing permits
for 142 million acres of public land representing 12 million animal unit months of grazing. PUBLIC
LAND STATISTICS, supra note 28, at 26. By contrast, 7,101 operators held grazing leases for 16 million
acres of public land constituting 1.5 million animal unit months of grazing. Id.
For a discussion of the differences between permits and leases, see infra notes 47-57 and
accompanying text.
36. Following an attempt by the Reagan administration to delegate essentially all of the BLM's
oversight authority to local ranchers, the Eastern District of California mandated certain minimal
functions which the BLM, under the federal grazing statutes, must serve. NRDC v. Hodel, 618 F. Supp.
848 (E.D. Cal. 1985). See generally PNRL, supra note 10, § 19.03, at 19-13 to 19-14.
These minimum requirements include the specification of grazing limits in the permit, either by
incorporation ofthe allotment management plan orby specification of exact grazing levels in the permit.
Hodel, 618 F. Supp. at 869. The BLM must also reserve permit revision and cancellation authority.
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specify the allotments to be used, the kind and number of livestock
authorized to graze, and the times of the year during which the land may
be used.37 A permit or lease must also specify the intensity with which
the land may be grazed, measured in animal unit months.3 Permits and
leases may contain additional terms necessary for the management of the
allotment,39 or such terms may be incorporated into the permit or lease in
the form of an Allotment Management Plan.4"
The Taylor Act requires the BLM to give preference for grazing permits
or leases to persons engaged in the livestock business who own or control
land near the desired allotment or rights to water necessary for watering
livestock on the allotment.4' Ranchers may transfer these preferences with
the consent of the BLM.42 While the BLM has the authority to modify
the terms and amount of grazing permits, or to cancel them altogether,43
Id. at 870-71.
37. 43 C.F.R § 4130.6-1(a) (1992).
38. Id. According to BLM regulations, an "animal unit month" is "the amount offorage necessary
for the sustenance of one cow or its equivalent for a period of 1 month." 43 C.F.R. § 4100.0-5 (1992).
Professor Feller reports that, in practice, permissible grazing levels may actually be determined on
an annual basis. Feller, supra note 6, at 575. These levels may or may not be in accordance with the
allotment management plan. Id. at 576. See infra note 40 and accompanying text.
39. 43 C.F.R. § 4130.6-2 (1992). Such conditions may include: authorization to use, and
directions for placement of, additional feed and salt; reporting requirements; provisions to temporarily
discontinue grazing to allow the introduction of plants; or the recovery of indigenous plants or other
administrative or "range management" goals. Id.
40. 43 C.F.R. § 4120.2(a) (1992). Allotment management plans, which are land use plans for a
group of allotments, must be developed by the BLM in consultation with permittees, local landowners,
state governments, and local grazing advisory boards. Id. They are developed pursuant to FLPMA.
43 U.S.C. § 1752(d) (1988).
41. 43 U.S.C. §§ 315b, 315m (1988). The BLM further defines this property, called "base
property," in relevant part as follows:
(1) [Base property] serves as a base for a livestock operation which utilizes public lands
within a grazing district; or
(2) [Base property] is contiguous land, or non-contiguous land when no applicant owns or
controls contiguous land, used in conjunction with a livestock operation which utilizes public
lands outside a grazing district.
43 C.F.RI § 4110.2-1 (1992).
42. 43 C.F.R. § 4110.2-3 (1992).
43. 43 U.S.C. §§ 315b, 1752(a) (1988); 43 C.F.R. § 4130.6-3 (1992); United States v. Fuller, 409
U.S. 488, 489 (1973) (stating that Taylor Act permits are revocable); Swim v. Bergland, 696 F.2d 712,
715 (9th Cir. 1983) (holding that permits may be modified or cancelled to implement tribal grazing
rights); Mollohan v. Gray, 413 F.2d 349, 353 (9th Cir. 1969) (stating that permits confer a mere
privilege, withdrawable without compensation); LaRue v. Udall, 324 F.2d 428, 431 (D.C. Cir. 1963)
(allowing permit revocation), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 907 (1964); United States v. Cox, 190 F.2d 293,
294 (10th Cir.) (stating that permits confer a privilege withdrawable at anytime without compensation),
cert. denied, 342 U.S. 867 (1951); Oman v. United States, 179 F.2d 738, 742 (10th Cir. 1949) (same);
Osborne v. United States, 145 F.2d 892, 896 (9th Cir. 1944) (same); Bowman v. Udall, 243 F. Supp.
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it must respect the preference rights of persons who qualify for allotments
of lands on which grazing is permitted.' In addition, the Taylor Act
requires the BLM to renew permits of permittees who have pledged their
"grazing units" as security for a loan, as long as they are in compliance
with BLM regulations.4" Indeed, the D.C. Circuit noted that those who
qualify for a preference are "entitled as of right" to a permit as against
others.4 6
For the majority of the rangelands it manages, the BLM is required to
control grazing through the issuance of grazing permits.47 However, for
certain isolated lands, the BLM is authorized to issue grazing leases. The
main difference between the two devices is the quality of the property
interest they provide to the holder. Holders of grazing leases possess actual
property rights as against the government, and regulations that deprive a
leaseholder of grazing rights bestowed by the lease may constitute a Fifth
Amendment taking for which compensation is due." In fact, the Oregon
672, 678 (D.D.C. 1965) (same), affd sub nom., Hinton v. Udall, 364 F.2d 676 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied
385 U.S. 878 (1966); Sellas v. Kirk, 101 F. Supp. 237, 239 (D. Nev. 1951) (same), affd, 200 F.2d 217
(9th Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 940 (1953).
But see Hinsdale Livestock v. United States, 501 F. Supp. 773 (D. Mont. 1980) (holding that a
drought was not a satisfactory reason for cancelling a permit, and enjoining such cancellation).
Professor Coggins notes that Judge Battin, who wrote the opinion in Hinsdale, has evidently reversed
himself on this point. PRNL, supra note 10, § 19.02, at 19-9 n.17 (citing Schwenke v. Secretary of the
Interior, 21 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,542, 20,547 (D. Mont. 1990)).
44. 43 U.S.C. § 1752(c) (1988); 43 C.F.R. § 4130.2(d) (1992); McNeil v. Seaton, 281 F.2d 931,
935 (D.C. Cir. 1960) (holding that a plaintiff cannot be deprived of preference by the Secretary of
Interior's adoption of a special rule); Red Canyon Sheep Co. v. Ickes, 98 F.2d 308, 314 (D.C. Cir.
1938).
45. 43 U.S.C. § 315b (1988).
46. Red Canyon Sheep, 98 F.2d at 314.
47. See supra notes 33-35 and accompanying text.
48. United States v. Certain Parcels of Land in San Bernardino County, 296 F. Supp. 774 (C.D.
Cal. 1969). See also Michael J. Kaplan, Annotation, Construction and Application of Taylor Grazing
Act, 42 A.L.R. FED. 353, 394-95 (1979). But see Bowman v. Udall, 243 F. Supp. 672 (D.D.C. 1965)
(stating, as dicta, that a lease granted under 43 U.S.C. § 315m is a privilege which may be withdrawn
from the holder without compensation), afTd sub nom., Hinton v. Udall 364 F.2d 676 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 385 U.S. 878 (1966); PNRL, supra note 10, § 19.03[3][b], at 19-18 n.52 (stating that Parcels
was almost certainly overruled by United States v. Fuller, 409 U.S. 488 (1973)).
The court in Parcels noted that 43 U.S.C. § 315b, which regulates the grant of permits, expressly
states that permits create no right in the holder. 296 F. Supp. at 775. However, it observed that 43
U.S.C. § 315m, which allows the grants of leases, contains no such language. Id. The court reasoned
that Congress would have placed a similar reservation in § 315m if it desired leaseholders to have no
rights against the government. Id. Thus, the court held that grazing leases were property, and,
therefore, compensable in a condemnation preceding. Id. at 776.
Professor Coggins' interpretation of Fuller as overruling Parcels, PNRL, supra note 10, §
19.03[3][b], at 19-18 n.52, is suspect. First, Fuller deals with Taylor Act permits, not leases. 409 U.S.
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Supreme Court has held BLM grazing leases to be taxable possessory
interests.49
In contrast, grazing permits do not grant property rights as against the
government, and subsequent modifications by the BLM of permit terms do
not constitute takings under the Fifth Amendment." However, it is clear
that the holder of a permit does have property rights as against other
private individuals.5 Other characteristics of BLM permits also suggest
that they should be considered property interests. A Taylor Act permittee
may sublease public lands for which he holds a grazing permit as long as
the leased lands include the base property to which the permit is at-
tached. 2 Under its regulations, the BLM must approve the transfer of
grazing privileges,53 but at least one court has enforced a contract that
illegally transferred such preferences between private parties.5 In
addition, the market value of a ranch to which a permit is attached reflects
at 489. Second, the Court's holding in Fuller-that the value of property derived from the holding of
grazing permits is not compensable in a condemnation proceeding for land held in fee simple-is not
pertinent to the issue in Parcels. Finally, the Fuller Court did not even address the statutory arguments
that support the Parcels holding.
49. Sproul v. Gilbert, 359 P.2d 543 (Or. 1961).
50. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
51. See Garcia v. Andrus, 692 F.2d 89, 94 (9th Cir. 1982) (enforcing the right of an owner of one-
third of a base property to receive a preference for that property over the owner of the other two-thirds);
McNeil v. Seaton, 281 F.2d 931 (D.C. Cir. 1960) (upholding preference holder's right to property over
others despite Department of Interior special regulations); Oman v. United States, 179 F.2d 738, 742
(10th Cir. 1949) (holding that Taylor Act grazing permittees had a cause of action under the Federal
Tort Claims Act against federal employees who allegedly aided others in using plaintiff's permitted
lands). See also John S. Harbison, Hohfeld and Herefords: The Concept of Property and the Law of
the Range, 22 N.M. L. REV. 459,463 (1992) ("[P]ermittees and lessees acquire rights [under the Taylor
Grazing Act] of the kind that do constitute property.").
52. See REsouRcEs, COMMUNITY AND ECON. DEa. DIVISION, U.S. GENERAL AccOUNTING OFFICE,
RANGELAND MANAGEMENT: GRAZING LEASE ARRANGEMENTS OF BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT
PERMITrEEs (1986) [hereinafter GAO, GRAZING LEASE ARRANGEMENTS]; C. Kerry Gee & Albert G.
Madsen, The Cost of Subleasing Federal Grazing Privileges (August 1986), reprinted in Bureau ofLand
Management Reauthorization: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Public Lands, National Parks and
Forests of the Senate Comm. on Energy and Natural Resources, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 148-58 (1992)
[hereinafter 1992 Reauthorization Hearing].
The BLM does not allow subleasing of grazing-permitted lands unless the base property is also
leased. 43 C.F.R. §§ 4140.1(a)(6), 4100.0-5 (1992). In addition, the BLM prohibits grazing of
livestock not owned or controlled by the permittee or lessee. Id.
53. 43 C.F.R. § 4120.3-6 (1992).
54. United States v. Redland, 695 P.2d 1031 (Wyo. 1985) (upholding an otherwise illegal transfer
of grazing rights, where the BLM was aware of, and later condoned, the transaction based on the
BLM's responsibility to enforce its own regulations).
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the property interest bestowed by the permit.5 Such interests are taxable
as a part of a decedent's estate under the federal estate tax rules,56 and
California even considers grazing permits a sufficient possessory interest
to be taxed under its property tax.5
In recent years, one of the most controversial aspects of the federal
grazing program has been the level of fees that the BLM charges grazing
permittees and lessees.5 Critics complain that the fixed fee is below
"market value" for comparable grazing on private rangelands.5 9 On the
other hand, the cattle industry argues that, at current BLM rates, it actually
costs more to use public land than private lands." The General Account-
ing Office has determined that the formula the BLM uses to calculate
55. PNRL, supra note 10, § 19.01, at 19-4. See also Estate of Cronin v. Cronin, 237 N.W.2d 171
(S.D. 1975) (holding that estate appraisers erred in not considering grazing permits in determining value
of deceased's lands).
56. Rev. Rul. 86-99, 1986-2 C.B. 159.
57. Board of Supervisors v. Archer, 96 Cal. Rptr. 379 (Ct. App. 1971).
58. See, e.g., Catalina Camia, With Grazing Fee Hike Certain, Question Becomes How Much, 51
CONG. Q. WKLY. REP. 2150 (1993); John A. Baden, New Range Wars and the Grazing-Fee Dilemma,
THE SEATTLE TIMES, Dec. 22, 1992, at A 1l; Rudy Abramson, Lawmakers Block Increase in Grazing
Fees, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 24, 1992, at A3; Anna Maria Gillis, Should Cows Chew Cheatgrass on
Commonlands?, BIOSCIENCE, Nov. 1991, at 668, 674; Phillip A. Davis, East Meets West in Latest Fight
Over Grazing Fee Increase, 49 CONG. Q. WKLY. REP. 1656 (1991). See generally 1992
Reauthorization Hearing; Grazing Management and Grazing Fee Issues, Hearing Before the Subcomm.
on Public Lands, National Parks and Forests of the Senate Comm. on Energy and Natural Resources,
102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992) [hereinafter 1992 Grazing Fee Hearing]; BLM Reauthorization and
Grazing Fees: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on National Parks and Public Lands of the House Comm.
on Interior and Insular Affairs, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991) [hereinafter 1991 Reauthorization
Hearing]; Reauthorization of the BLM: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on National Parks and Public
Lands of the House Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 101st Cong., Ist Sess. (1989) [hereinafter
1989 Reauthorization Hearing].
59. See, e.g., 1991 Reauthorization Hearing, supra note 58, at 25 (statement of Representative
Synar) (arguing that current grazing fees do not reflect market rates.)
60. See, e.g., 1992 Grazing Fee Hearing, supra note 58, at 186-88; 1991 Reauthorization Hearing,
supra note 58, at 70-80. Other livestock industry representatives argue that the costs to use public and
private lands are the same. See, e.g., 1991 Reauthorization Hearing, supra note 58, at 213. However,
livestock industry comparisons do not make explicit the times that certain costs are incurred, which
impacts the net present value of the costs involved. See Neil R. Rimbey, Federal Grazing Fees: The
Never-Ending Story, reprinted in 1992 Grazing Fee Hearing, supra note 58, at 86, 90. Additionally,
such estimates probably do not take into account the opportunity cost to the public land rancher to move
his herd to private lands. See also RAY F. BROKKEN & BRUCE A. MCCARL, ECONOMIC RESEARCH
SERVICE, U.S. DEP'T OF AGRICULTURE, AGRICULTURAL ECONOMIC REPORT No. 570, A THEORETICAL
EVALUATION OF FEE SYSTEMS FOR PRIVATE GRAZING ON FEDERAL LANDS (1987).
There is also a school of thought, fueled largely by the Sagebrush Rebellion of the late 1970s, that
the western rangelands should be privatized. See generally WAYNE HAGE, STOIRM OVER RANGELANDS:
PRIVATE RIGHTS IN THE FEDERAL LANDS (1989); GARY D. LIBECAP, LOCKING UP THE RANGE:
FEDERAL LAND CONTROLS AND GRAZING (1981).
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grazing fee levels inherently produces low fees.6' Over the last several
years, many alternative proposals have been introduced in Congress that
would either codify the existing grazing fee formula62 or require the BLM
to charge higher fees.63 In August 1993, the Clinton administration
proposed rules that would raise grazing fees threefold.'
While critics of the BLM's grazing fees may be misguided in their
contention that the fees do not reflect market prices,65 their more basic
claim that the fees reflect a subsidy to ranchers appears correct.6 6 The fee
charged does not cover the cost of administering the rangeland grazing
program.67 Thus, permittees and lessees get a bargain.6" Furthermore,
61. RESOURCES, COMMUNITY AND ECON. DEV. DIVISION, U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE,
RANGELAND MANAGEMENT: CURRENT FORMULA KEEPS GRAZING FEES Low 2 (1991) [hereinafter
GAO, CURRENT FORMULA]. The formula for determining grazing fees is designed to take into account
the ability of ranchers to pay based on their profitability levels. This is supposed to produce cheaper
grazing rates when ranching is less profitable, and vice versa. However, the formula actually double
counts the profitability factor by including one factor that is based on the market rate for private forage,
and another that accounts for ranching profitability. Id. at 16-17. Because the cost of forage is directly
related to the profitability of the ranching industry, both of these factors measure the same
thing-ability to pay. Id.
62. See, e.g., H.R. 1292, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991); H.R. 1670, 101st Cong., Ist Sess. (1989).
63. See, e.g., H.R. 643, 103d Cong., Ist Sess. (1993); H.R. 944, 102d Cong., 1st Sess, (1991).
64. 58 Fed. Reg. 43,227 (proposed Aug. 13, 1993) (to be codified at 43 C.F.R. § 4130.7-1). See
also Catalina Camia, Administration Aims to Increase Grazing Fees, Tighten Rules, 51 CONG. Q. WKLY.
REP. 2223 (1993).
65. The package of services that a rancher receives from the government is different from that
which she would normally receive in a private rangeland lease. Rimbey, supra note 60, at 86. See also
supra notes 42-46.
In addition, because there is no real market for the grazing of these lands, it cannot be said that there
is a market value for such a use. See Coggins II, supra note 28, at 75. The fee the government charges
for the grazing of these lands should be determined by the goal it wants to achieve. See GAO,
CURRENT FORMULA, supra note 61, at 31 ("If the primary objective is to track changes in forage prices
paid on private lands or to recover the government's costs of administering the livestock grazing
program... substantial revisions [in the fee structure] would be needed.').
66. See PNRL, supra note 10, § 19.02, at 19-10 to 19-12.
67. In 1991, the BLM grazing fee was $1.97 per animal unit month. 1991 Reauthorization
Hearing, supra note 58, at 217. In that year, the BLM permitted grazing for 13.3 million animal unit
months. RESOURCES, COMMUNITY AND ECON. DEV. DIVISION, U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE,
RANGELAND MANAGEMENT: PROFILE OF THE BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT'S GRAZING
ALLOTMENTS AND PERMITS 14 (1992). Thus, the BLM's receipts should have been $26.2 million.
GAO estimated that the BLM allocated $28.9 million for its rangeland management in 1991.
RESOURCES, COMMUNITY AND ECON. DEv. DIvISION, U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, BLM
RESOURCE ALLOCATION 13 (1992).
Other estimates recognize this disparity. See, e.g., GAO, CURRENT FORMULA, supra note 61, at 23
(estimating that in 1990, BLM's livestock-related costs were $21 million and its receipts from grazing
fees were $19 million, but suggesting BLM understated its costs). A House of Representatives
committee report estimated that BLM administration costs in 1983 were $2.65 for every $1.35 received.
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there is substantial evidence that holders of federally granted grazing rights
can sometimes sublease those rights, legally or illegally, for a-substantially
higher fee than that charged by the government. 69 Typically, ranches with
attached grazing permits are worth more than those without such rights.7"
In fact, banks often make loans secured by grazing permits as collateral.7"
The existence of these circumstances, critics argue, shows that grazing
permits must represent a subsidy. If these permits conferred no benefit
beyond the price the government charges, the above phenomena should not
be observed.72 After reviewing the BLM policies, the House Committee
on Government Operations characterized the BLM's administration of the
public rangelands as a direct drain on the federal treasury.73
Permits may be canceled, suspended, or modified for violation of their
terms.74 In addition, permits may be modified if allotment monitoring
data show that "present grazing use is not meeting the land use plan or
HOUSE CoMM. ON GOV'T OPERATIONS, FEDERAL GRAZING PROGRAM: ALL IS NOT WELL ON THE
RANGE, H.R. REP. 593, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1986) [hereinafter HOUSE GRAZING REPORT]. In
addition, the report notes that only approximately one-third of the permit revenues are actually returned
to the U.S. Treasury. Id. The other funds are used for various purposes, including distributions to state
governments. Id.
68. The BLM spends substantial amounts on range improvements. See HOUSE GRAZING REPORT,
supra note 67, at 28. In fact, 50% of grazing fees, or $10 million, whichever is greater, must be spent
directly on range improvements each year. 43 U.S.C. § 1751(b) (1988). The BLM also spends
conNiderable amounts of money on predator control programs that may not be included in its rangeland
management budget. George C. Coggins, Livestock Grazing on the Public Lands: Lessons from the
Failure of Official Conservation, 20 GONZ. L. REv. 748, 757 (1984-85) [hereinafter Coggins Speech].
For example, the Department of the Interior spends millions of dollars to kill coyotes and other
livestock predators. Id. In addition, the government may spend money to eliminate insects, such as
grasshoppers, that would otherwise affect the quality of the rangeland for forage. Id.
69. See HOUSE GRAZING REPORT, supra note 67, at 12-19; Gee & Madsen, supra note 52; GAO,
GRAZING LEASE ARRANGEMENTS, supra note 52, at 2.
70. Coggins II, supra note 28, at 74.
71. Id.
72. Id. See also HOUSE GRAZING REPORT, supra note 67, at 20 (citing FOREST SERVICE,
DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE & BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT, DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR,
GRAZING FEE REVIEW AND EVALUATION: A REPORT FROM THE SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE AND THE
SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR 49-50 (1986)) (stating that if the courts allowed permittees to claim
compensation for taking of permits, a "permittee [would] retain the capitalized value of a resource that
belongs to the public"). But see 1989 Reauthorization Hearing, supra note 58, at 182 (offering other
explanations for these phenomena); BROKKEN & MCCARL, supra note 60, at 2-4 (same).
73. HOUSE GRAZING REPORT, supra note 67, at 5-36. The Committee characterized the rangeland
program this way because the fee does not cover administrative costs, id. at 10, and permittees gain
profits at the expense of the public treasury through subleasing and enhanced value of base property,
id. at 12-20, ineffective permit enforcement, id. at 21-23, and damage to the land, id. at 26.
74. 43 C.F.R. § 4130.6-1(b) (1992); Diamond Ring Ranch, Inc. v. Morton, 531 F.2d 1397, 1401-
02 (10th Cir. 1976).
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management objectives."'  Ranchers grazing on federal land without a
permit, or grazing more livestock than allowed in their permit, are guilty
of "trespass"76 and are liable for damages to the property arising from the
trespass." Persons who willfully trespass, violate permit terms, or
damage public lands are liable for a fine of up to $1,000 and imprisonment
of up to one year.78
B. The Condition of Public Rangeland: Problems and Causes
Overgrazing poses a significant threat to the ecological viability of public
rangelands. However, due to political and budgetary constraints, the BLM
has been unable to effectively limit the practice. These circumstances make
citizen enforcement of grazing limits through qui tam actions an attractive
approach to combatting the overgrazing problem.
While the deterioration of the public rangelands has abated somewhat
since the enactment of the Taylor Act in 1934,79 the rangelands have not
recovered fully from the large-scale ecological catastrophes caused by
overgrazing in the late nineteenth century. 0 Today, the condition of the
75. 43 C.F.R. § 4130.6-3 (1992). Land use plans are regional plans developed to further
"recreation, range, timber, minerals, watershed, wildlife and fish, and natural scenic, scientific and
historical values." 43 U.S.C. §§ 1712, 1702(c) (1988). See 43 C.F.R. § 1601.0-5(k) (1992). See
generally George C. Coggins, The Law of Public Rangeland Management IV. FLPMA, PRIA, and the
Multiple Use Mandate, 14 ENvTL. L. 1 (1983).
76. PNRL, supra note 10, § 19.03, at 19-23 (citing Kent Gregerson, 101 I.B.L.A. 269 (1988)).
77. 43 C.F.R. § 4150.1 (1992). BLM regulations assess liability based on whether the trespass
was "nonwillful," "willful," or "repeated willful." For nonwillful violations, the violator must pay
damages in the amount of the value of the forage consumed by trespassing livestock at the market rate
on private lands. Id. at § 4150.3(a). Willful violators must pay twice the market value of the forage
consumed, id. at § 4150.3(b), and repeated willful violators must pay three times its value, id. at §
4150.3(c).
In 1991, the General Accounting Office reported that the BLM charged $9.19 per animal unit month
in these cases. GAO, CumRENT FORmuLA, supra note 61, at 27 (1991). See also Kent Gregersen, 101
I.B.L.A. 269, 270 (1988) (upholding trespass assessment in 1984 at a rate of $8.85 per animal unit
month).
78. 43 C.F.R. § 4170.2-2 (1992); 43 U.S.C § 1733(a) (1988). A separate fine of $500 is
assessable under the authority of the Taylor Act. 43 C.F.R. § 4170.2-1 (1992).
79. See Coggins I, supra note 1, at 551-52; 1991 Reauthorization Hearing, supra note 58, at 86.
In fact, the Dust Bowl of the 1930s, caused in part by overgrazing, may have been an important
factor in the passage of the Act. Coggins II, supra note 28, at 46-47.
80. Coggins Speech, supra note 68, at 754-55.
In the "Great Debacle" of 1889-90, overgrazing, coupled with a summer drought and severe winters,
resulted in reduced rangeland productivity. The ensuing forage shortage caused the death of millions
of livestock. Coggins II, supra note 28, at 22. Professor Coggins noted: "One [ranch] in Nevada and
Idaho that had branded 38,000 calves in 1885 found only 68 calves on the same area in 1890." Id.
(citing Young et al., Successional Patterns and Productivity Potentials of the Sagebrush and Salt Desert
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rangelands remains less than adequate.
The BLM categorizes two-thirds of the lands under its control as in
"fair" or "poor" shape."1  These labels indicate that the lands produce less
than one-half of the forage that they are capable of producing.82 Reduced
levels of ground cover increase erosion problems and degradation of native
plant and animal species. 83 Moreover, overgrazing has destroyed riparian
areas within the public rangelands.84 Congress, in enacting the Public
Rangelands Improvement Act,85 found that "vast segments of the public
rangelands are producing less than their potential... and for that reason
are in unsatisfactory condition."86
These problems are largely a result of abusive grazing practices. The
historical practice of overgrazing has continued despite prohibitive statutes
and regulations. Even today, the BLM continues to issue permits that
authorize excessive grazing, and ranchers continue to violate permit limits
and trespass on federal lands.87
Ecos ,ystems, in NAS SYMPOSIuM IV 27 (1981)).
In addition, the "Spanish-style" ranching techniques traditionally employed in the West encouraged
overgrazing. Because use of the range was free, there were no cost restraints on the amount to which
it could be grazed, leading inevitably to overgrazing. Coggins I, supra note 1, at 547-49. See also
Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243 (1968).
81. 1991 Reauthorization Hearing, supra note 58, at 86.
82. Coggins Speech, supra note 68, at 753 (citing NRDC v. Morton, 388 F. Supp. 829 (D.D.C.
1974)).
Indeed, the intensity at which lands are grazed today has a direct bearing on the level of forage
production tomorrow. See RESOURCES, COMMUNITY AND ECON. DEv. DIVISION, U.S. GENERAL
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, RANGELAND MANAGEMENT: MORE EMPHASIS NEEDED ON DECLINING AND
OVERSTOCKED GRAZING ALLOTMENTS 26-27 (1988) [hereinafter GAO, OVERSTOCKED GRAZING
ALLOTMENTS]; Gillis, supra note 58, at 674.
83. HOUSE GRAZING REPORT, supra note 67, at 66; Coggins Speech, supra note 68, at 753-54.
For a thorough explanation of the way overgrazing affects rangeland resources, and of the ecological
impact of overgrazing, see DENZEL FERGUSON & NANCY FERGUSON, SACRED COWS AT THE PUBLIC
TROUGH 60-130 (1983).
84. RESOURCES, COMMUNITY, AND ECON. DEv. DIVISION, U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE,
RANGELAND MANAGEMENT: ASSESSMENT OF NEVADA CONSULTING FIRM'S CRITIQUE OF THREE GAO
REPORTS 18-19 (1992) (quoting COUNCIL ON ENVTL. QUALITY, DESERTIFICATION OF THE UNITED
STATES (1981)); U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, LIVESTOCK GRAZING ON WESTERN
RIPARIAN AREAS (1990); U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, SOME RIPARIAN AREAS RESTORED BUT
WIDESPREAD IMPROVEMENT WILL BE SLOW (1988); HOUSE GRAZING REPORT, supra note 67, at 26;
Richard H. Braun, Emerging Limits on Federal Land Management Discretion: Livestock Riparian
Ecosystems, and Clean Water Law, 17 ENVTL. L. 43, 44-45 (1986); Coggins Speech, supra note 68,
at 754.
85. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1908 (1988) (originally enacted as Act of Oct. 25, 1978, 92 Stat. 1803).
86. 43 U.S.C. § 1901(a)(1) (1988).
87. See infra notes 88-99 and accompanying text.
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Many authorities agree that the history of the BLM is marked by
subservience to cattle interests.88 Local ranchers have long played a
prominent role in determining the amount of grazing allotments available
for lease.89 The shape of allotments today is directly related to decisions
made sixty years ago by advisory boards comprised of local ranchers
during the initial implementation of the Taylor Act.90 Even when new
scientific information indicating that the actual cattle carrying capacity of
allotments was less than had been permitted became available, the advisory
boards were often able to block proposals to decrease grazing allowanc-
es.9' Thus, in the summer of 1993, the Clinton administration moved to
include biologists and environmentalists on the advisory boards.92
The BLM has been constrained further in its attempts to properly manage
the public lands by the lack of information on the conditions of the
rangelands under its authority. Although the BLM is required to develop
rangeland management plans and determine the environmental impact of its
actions,93 such requirements are ineffective if the agency does not have
88. Coggins II, supra note 28, at 90; Braun, supra note 84, at 57-58. See generally Coggins II,
supra note 28, at 61-75.
89. BLM regulations contemplate consultation with advisory boards, comprised mainly of local
ranchers, for guidance in administration of the allotments. See 43 C.F.R. §§ 4110.2(a) (1992). These
boards have been created over the years under a variety of statutory authorities. See 43 U.S.C. § 315o-I
(1988) (Taylor Act authorization held expired in Carpenter v. Morton, 424 F. Supp. 603 (D. Nev.
1976)); 43 U.S.C. § 1753 (1988) (FLPMA authorization expired in 1985); Federal Advisory Committee
Act, 5 U.S.C. app. §§ 1-14 (1988).
90. Coggins II, supra note 28, at 56-58. When the Department of the Interior first took control
of the public rangelands after the enactment of the Taylor Act, the Department had no infrastructure
through which to administer the lands. Id. at 56-57. The only people with the detailed knowledge of
the lands necessary for the administration of the lands at that time were the ranchers themselves;
therefore, the Department relied on the ranchers. Id. The Department established grazing boards
comprised of ranchers who not only served a consultative function, but also served as the "local
governing agency as to all matters of a range regulatory nature." Id. at 57 (citing U.S. DEP'T OF
INTERIOR, 1938 ANN. REP. SEC. 15-16, quoted in P. Foss, POLITICS AND GRASS 81-82 (1960)). These
boards also made the initial determination of allotment carrying capacity. Coggins I1, supra note 28,
at 58.
91. Coggins I, supra note 1, at 552; Coggins II, supra note 28, at 90.
92. 58 Fed. Reg. 43,230 (proposed Aug. 13, 1993) (to be codified at 43 C.F.R. § 1784.6-4). See
generally 58 Fed. Reg. 43,208-231 (1993); Camia, supra note 64.
93. FLPMA, 43 U.S.C. § 1752(d) (1988), requires the BLM to develop allotment management
plans. FLPMA also requires the BLM to create land use plans for all public lands that the BLM
administers. Id. at § 1712(a). These plans must incorporate "the principles of multiple use and
sustained yield." Id. at § 1712(c). See supra note 32.
Further, under the National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370 (1988), the BLM
must develop environmental impact statements for the grazing districts it administers. NRDC v.
Morton, 388 F. Supp. 829, 841 (D.D.C. 1974), af'd, 527 F.2d 1386 (D.C. Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 427
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access to reliable data on lands within its jurisdiction. Budget constraints
and poorly conceived information collection strategies often prevent the
BLM from obtaining such data.
94
Authorities generally agree that the BLM does not have the resources to
adequately enforce the grazing permits it issues.95 Thus, ranchers have
little incentive to comply with permit limitations. In 1990, the Government
Accounting Office reported that many rangeland allotments are either rarely
visited or not visited at all. 96 The BLM has no systematic approach for
detecting grazing trespass.97 In addition, although the BLM has substan-
tial authority to penalize violators,98 it has been rather lenient in assessing
penalties against those it does find guilty of trespass.99
Public involvement in the BLM decisionmaking process represents a
promising mechanism for halting the practice of issuing grazing permits
U.S. 913 (1976).
94. According to the General Accounting Office, the condition of much of the public rangeland
is unknown because the BLM's data are either old or unreliable, and the agency lacks sufficient
resources to maintain an adequate information base. GAO, OVERSTOCKED GRAZING ALLOTMENTS,
supra note 82, at 20. For example, the GAO found that much of the data on the rangelands is over five
years old. Id. at 21. The GAO also found that ELM rangeland managers, from whom rangeland data
is primarily derived, did not "know current conditions and trends for much of their range." Id. at 20.
See also Gillis, supra note 58, at 669-71; Giles T. Rafsnider et al., Range Survey Cost Sharing and the
Efflcienc , ofRangeland Use, 63 LAND ECON. 92 (1987) (evaluating a proposal that range managers and
private beneficiaries share in the costs of range surveys).
95. For example, Representative Vento, chairman of the House Subcommittee on National Parks
and Public Lands, stated:
[The] BLM's roughly 400-member range staff are currently attempting to manage the grazing
activity of over four million head of domestic livestock spread over 165 million acres and
administered through 22,000 grazing allotments. On the average, each range staff member
is responsible for 47 grazing permits, and 392,000 acres. At least 26 of the staff members
have a responsibility for more than one million acres each.
1991 Reauthorization Hearing, supra note 58, at 103. See also RESOURCES, COMMUNITY AND ECON.
DEv. DIVISION, U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, RANGELAND MANAGEMENT: BLM EFFORTS TO
PREVENT UNAUTHORIZED LIVESTOCK GRAZING NEED STRENGTHENING 3 (1990) [hereinafter GAO,
BLM EFFORTS]; GAO, OVERSTOCKED GRAZING ALLOTMENTS, supra note 82, at 39; Coggins II, supra
note 28, at 90 (citing W. CALEF, PRIVATE GRAZING AND PUBLIC LANDS 70-72, 143 (1960)).
96. GAO, ELM EFFORTS, supra note 95, at 3.
97. Id. at 4.
98. See supra notes 76-78 and accompanying text. See also Coggins II, supra note 28, at 91.
99. GAO, BLM EFFORTS, supra note 95, at 5-8 (reporting that the ELM handles 84-88% of
grazing permit violations informally, and rarely assesses penalties); HOUSE GRAZING REPORT, supra
note 67, at 21-24 (finding that the record of BLM trespass cases closed shows that grazing trespass
enforcement is a low priority at most BLM field offices); Coggins II, supra note 28, at 91 (noting that
the BLM asserts control over third-party trespassers, but seems hesitant to control its own permittees'
noncompliance).
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that authorize overgrazing.00 However, enforcement of grazing permits
by the BLM seems unlikely to improve given current budget realities.'0 '
A potential solution to this underenforcement problem may be available in
qui tam suits brought by citizens, on behalf of the government, against
ranchers who operate in violation of their grazing permits. Part III provides
an overview of qui tam actions as authorized under the False Claims Act,
and Part IV argues that the False Claims Act would allow, in some circum-
stances, qui tam suits against ranchers responsible for overgrazing.
III. Qu! TAM AND THE FALSE CLAIMS ACT
A. History and Description of the False Claims Act
The qui tam 2 action is brought by a citizen on behalf of the federal
government. It has a long tradition in Anglo-American jurisprudence,"°3
but has fallen largely into disuse in the current day." The False Claims
100. Land use plans must comply with the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), see NRDC
v. Morton, 388 F. Supp. 829 (D.D.C. 1974), which requires public participation in the development of
Environmental Impact Statements for any major federal action that might significantly affect the
environment. 40 C.F.R. 1503.1(a)(4) (1993). See generally DANIEL R. MANDELKER, NEPA: LAW AND
LITIGATION § 7.12 (1984).
It appears that persons who use grazing areas for any purpose identified under FLPMA, 43 U.S.C.
§ 1702(c) (1988), are interested parties for the purposes of actions under 43 C.F.R. § 4160 (1992). See
Donald K. Majors, 123 I.B.L.A. 142 (1992) (holding that a person who used an allotment for
recreational purposes had an "affected interest" pursuant to 43 C.F.R. § 4100.0-5). Under another
recent administrative ruling, grazing permit renewals are considered actions for the purposes of FLPMA.
Therefore, renewals are subject to notice requirements, written explanations of decision, and appeal.
Feller, supra note 6, at 573 (citing Joseph M. Feller, No. UT-06-89.02 (U.S. Dep't of the Interior, Aug.
13, 1990)). See id. at 586-90.
101. See GAO, BLM EFFORTS, supra note 95, at 4.
102. Qui tam is an abbreviation for the Latin phrase "qui tam pro domino rege quam pro si ipso
in hac parte sequitur," which means "who sues on behalf of the King as well as himself." BLACK'S
LAW DICTIoNARY 1251 (6th ed. 1990).
103. Qui tam actions have their roots in thirteenth century common law, when they were used as
a means of gaining access to the royal courts. Note, The History and Development of Qui Tam, 1972
WASH. U. L.Q. 81, 85 [hereinafter Note]. As the royal courts gained dominance, this device fell into
disuse, but it regained vitality when Parliament, through statute, authorized qui tam actions to prosecute
crimes and civil wrongs against the crown. Id. at 86-91. Likewise, from the colonial days until the late
nineteenth century, legislatures in this country made provisions for informer actions. Id. at 97-100.
The device was effective for prosecuting crimes in an era when police resources were limited. Id. at
86, 101. See also Dan D. Pitzer, Comment, The Qui Tam Doctrine: A Comparative Analysis of Its
Application in the United States and the British Commonwealth, 7 TEX. INT'L L.i. 415, 417-18 (1972).
104. As public agencies became more effective at enforcing the laws, the need for such actions
decreased, and many of the enabling statutes were repealed. See Note, supra note 103, at 99-101.
Indeed, modem courts have grown hostile to such actions. The Refuse Act of 1899, 33 U.S.C. §§
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Act is the most important statute remaining that allows such actions.'
The False Claims Act was originally enacted to combat contractor
fraud. 6 The statute allows actions by either the Attorney General or a
private citizen against persons who: assert "false or fraudulent claims"
against the government; use, or allow to be used, false information to get
a false claim paid by the government; or conspire to make such a claim
against the government." 7 The statute authorizes civil penalties of
$5,000 to $10,000 as well as treble damages arising from the claim." 8
Faced with evidence of widespread fraud occurring throughout govern-
407-13 (1988), contains a provision that allowed for the reward of informers. However, courts have
rejected attempts to interpret this as an authorization for qui tam suits, see Sierra Club v. Andrus, 610
F.2d 581 (9th Cir. 1979), rev'd, 451 U.S. 287 (1981), despite precedent to the contrary. See United
States ew rel Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537, 541 n.4 (1943). See also Pitzer, supra note 103, at 438-40;
STAFF OF CONSERVATION & NATURAL RESOURCES SUBCONMI. OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON Gov'T
OPERATIONS, 91ST CONG., 2D SESS., QUi TAM ACTIONS AND THE 1899 REFUSE ACT: CITIZEN SUITS
AGAINST POLLUTION OF THE NATION'S WATERWAYS (Comm. Print 1970).
10S. Other statutes that allow informer actions include the following: Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230,
§ 39, 16 Stat. 198, 203 (codified at 35 U.S.C. § 292(b) (1988)) (regarding the false marking of articles
as patented); and Act of June 30, 1834, ch. 161, § 27, 4 Stat. 729, 733-34 (codified as amended at 25
U.S.C. § 201 (1988)) (regarding Indian trade).
106. John C. Kunich, Qui Tam: White Knight or Trojan Horse, 33 A.F. L. REv. 31, 31-32 (1990).
107. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(l)-(2) (1988). The statute provides in pertinent part:
(a) Liability for certain acts.-Any person who -
(1) knowingly presents, or causes to be presented, to an officer or employee of the United
States Government or a member of the Armed Forces of the United States a false or
fraudulent claim for payment or approval;
(2) knowingly makes, uses, or causes to be made or used, a false record or statement to
get a false or fraudulent claim paid or approved by the Government;
(3) conspires to defraud the Government by getting a false or fraudulent claim allowed or
paid;
is liable to the United States Government for a civil penalty of not less than $5,000 and not
more than $10,000, plus 3 times the amount of damages which the Government sustains
because of the act of that person ....
(b) Knowing and Knowingly defined.-For the purposes of this section, the terms "knowing"
and "knowingly" mean that a person, with respect to information -
(1) has actual knowledge of the information;
(2) acts in deliberate ignorance of the truth or falsity of the information; or
(3) acts in reckless disregard of the truth or falsity of the information,
and no proof of specific intent to defraud is required.
(c) Claim defined.-For purposes of this section, "claim" includes any request or demand,
whether under a contract or otherwise, for money or property which is made to a contractor,
grantee, or other recipient if the United States Government provides any portion of the money
or property which is requested or demanded, or if the Government will reimburse such
contractor, grantee, or other recipient for any portion of the money which is requested or
demanded.
31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)-(c) (1988).
108. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a) (1988).
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ment programs,'0 9 Congress amended the False Claims Act in 1986.
Before this time, judicial interpretations of certain provisions of the False
Claims Act, including those relating to its qui tam jurisdiction, had
restricted the Act's ability to combat fraud effectively.21 Thus, among
other changes, Congress extended the Act's reach from only those claims
that involved "immediate financial detriment ' "' to all "fraudulent
attempts to cause the Government to pay out sums of money or to deliver
property or services."".2  The amendments were intended "to make the
False Claims Act a more effective weapon against Government fraud.""' 3
B. Eligibility Requirements for Qui Tam Relators"4
To proceed under the False Claims Act, a qui tam plaintiff, called a
"relator," must first file a complaint. Then the complaint, along with all
material evidence and information the relator possesses, is served on the
Justice Department." 5 The Justice Department then has sixty days from
its receipt of the complaint to either proceed with the suit itself, or inform
109. S. REP. No. 345, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266, 5269
(stating that "fraud permeates generally all Government programs ranging from welfare and food stamps
benefits, to multibillion dollar defense procurements, to crop subsidies and disaster relief programs").
110. S. REP. No. 345, supra note 109, at 4, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5269. The
Committee on the Judiciary summarized its findings and intentions as follows:
Since the act was last amended in 1943, several restrictive court interpretations of the act have
emerged which tend to thwart the effectiveness of the statute. The Committee's amendments
contained in S.1562 are aimed at correcting restrictive interpretations of the act's liability
standard, burden of proof, qui tam jurisdiction and other provisions in order to make the False
Claims Act a more effective weapon against government fraud.
Id.
Ill. See United States v. McNinch, 356 U.S. 595, 599 (1958).
112. S. REP. No. 345, supra note 109, at 9, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5274.
113. Id. at 4, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5269.
114. In light of the recent developments in Article III standing doctrine, see, e.g., Lujan v.
Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S. Ct. 2130 (1992), the constitutionality of qui tam actions has been
questioned. However, the courts have uniformly rejected such attacks. See United States ex rel. Milam
v. University of Texas, 961 F.2d 46, 49 (4th Cir. 1992) (requiring that the government, rather than the
relator, show an injury in fact); United States ax reL Givler v. Smith, 775 F. Supp. 172, 180 (E.D. Pa.
1991) (holding that relators bringing qui tam action met Article III standing requirements); United States
ex rel. Newsham v. Lockheed Missiles & Space Co., 722 F. Supp. 607, 613-15 (N.D. Cal. 1989)
(same); United States ex rel. Stillwell v. Hughes Helicopters, Inc., 714 F. Supp. 1084, 1096-99 (C.D.
Cal. 1989) (holding relators had standing because they were essentially assignees of the United States).
See also Cass R. Sunstein, What's Standing after Lujan? Of Citizen Suits, "Injuries,'" and Article III,
91 MICH. L. RFv. 163 (1992); Thomas R. Lee, Comment, The Standing of Qui Tam Relators Under
the False Claims Act, 57 U. CHt. L. REv. 543 (1990).
For analysis of other constitutional issues involved with qui tam actions, see Evan Caminker,
Comment, The Constitutionality of Qui Tam Actions, 99 Yale L.J. 341 (1989).
115. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(I)-(2) (1988).
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the court that it does not intend to prosecute the action.1 16 During this
time, the complaint remains under seal."7 If the Justice Department does
not intervene, the relator may proceed with the action individually." 8
Informers are entitled to ten to thirty percent of the proceeds of their claim
depending on whether the source of the information regarding the fraud is
public, and whether the government decides to prosecute the action
itself.' Relators who prosecute the claim themselves are also entitled
to reasonable attorney fees and expenses. 20
Congress placed jurisdictional limits on qui tam actions based on the
source from which the relator obtains the information.'2 ' The limits were
instituted in order to combat problems with "parasitic" actions, that is, ones
in which citizens bring suit on the basis of information that is readily
available to the government.'22 Specifically, the Act denies courts the
jurisdiction to hear actions based on "public disclosure of allegations or
transactions" in government hearings or investigations or from the news
media, unless the relator is the "original source of the information."'"
This original source exception requires the relator to have "direct and
independent knowledge of the information" which forms the basis of the
allegations and to disclose the information to the government before filing
suit. 14
Courts have interpreted these restrictions broadly. The Second Circuit
held that for the "original source" exception to apply, the person filing the
qui tam action must be the source of the information that was publicly
disclosed."z The phrase "public disclosure" has also been defined
116. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(3)-(4) (1988).
117. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(2) (1988).
118. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(3) (1988).
119. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d) (1988).
120. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d)(4) (1988).
121. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e) (1988).
122. Robert L. Vogel, Eligibility Requirements for Relators Under Qui Tam Provisions of the False
Clains Act, 21 PUB. CONT. L.J. 593, 593-94 (1992). The action is labeled "parasitic" because it
"merely siphon[s] off funds that the government would have recovered [on its own] in the absence of
a qui tam suit." Id. at 594.
123. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(A) (1988).
124. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(B) (1988).
125. United States ex rel. Dick v. Long Island Lighting Co., 912 F.2d 13 (2d Cir. 1990). In Dick,
two employees of a nuclear power station filed suit against their employer, Long Island Lighting Co.
(LILCO), alleging that LILCO had lied to the New York Public Service Commission about construction
costs. 912 F.2d at 14. LILCO had thus fraudulently obtained approval for higher rates, and defrauded
the United States Government, a major electric consumer. Id.
The relators learned about the fraud from news media accounts of similar allegations made against
1994] 1425
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broadly. The Third Circuit held that information obtained in discovery in
a suit unrelated to the fraudulent claim was publicly disclosed, thus barring
qui tam jurisdiction. 2 6  Similarly, the Second Circuit held that informa-
tion disclosed by government investigators in the course of an investigation
constituted public information for the purposes of the jurisdictional bar. 27
Together, these cases imply that, in order to state a claim that the courts
will hear, a qui tam relator must have independently obtained information,
either by being in the right place at the right time, or by conducting an
investigation into facts that are not publicly available.
IV. Qu! TAM ACTIoNS AGAINST GRAZING PERMIT VIOLATORS
A. Statutory Elements
In order to state a claim, a person bringing suit under the False Claims
Act must show (1) that the defendant has presented a claim against the
government, and (2) that the claim is fraudulent.'28
LILCO by Suffolk County in an earlier suit. Id. at 14-15. The relators did not provide any additional
information in their complaint. Id. The Second Circuit did not dispute the fact that the relators had
direct and independent information on which the suit was based or that they voluntarily provided the
information to the government. However, the court added an additional requirement, that the relators
be a source to the entity that publicly disclosed the information. Id. at 16.
The Second Circuit's reasoning in Dick was followed by the Ninth Circuit in Wang v. FMC Corp.,
975 F.2d 1412, 1417 (9th Cir. 1992). However, the Fourth Circuit recently reached the opposite
conclusion in United States ex rel. Siller v. Becton Dickinson & Co., 21 F.3d 1339 (4th Cir. 1994),
vacating and remanding 813 F. Supp. 410, 413 (D. Md. 1993).
126. United States ex rel. Stinson, Lyons, Gerlin & Bustamante, P.A. v. Prudential Insurance Co.,
944 F.2d 1149 (3d Cir. 1991). In Stinson, the relator was a law firm representing a party against
Prudential Insurance Company. Id. at 1151. In the course of its representation, the relator obtained
documents indicating that Prudential had defrauded the government. Id. Prudential moved to dismiss,
alleging that the relator was not the original source of the information because it came upon the
information in a public hearing. Id. at 1152. The Third Circuit held that information produced in a
discovery proceeding is a public disclosure for purposes of the False Claims Act. Id. at 1159-60. The
court reasoned that the information obtained in discovery during a civil proceeding was available to the
public if they had chosen to look for it. Id. at 1159.
The Second Circuit has followed the Third Circuit's interpretation. See United States ex rel.
Kreindler & Kreindler v. United Technology Corp., 985 F.2d 1148, 1159 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 113
S. Ct. 2962 (1993).
127. United States ex reL Doe v. John Doe Corp., 960 F.2d 318 (2d Cir. 1992). In Doe, the relator
was an attorney representing an employee in a criminal fraud investigation. Id at 320. After
negotiating immunity for his client, the attorney filed a qui tam action against his client's employer.
Id. Prior to the filing of the suit, the government had conducted criminal and administrative
investigations of the fraud. Id. at 319-20. Government investigators, during the course of the
investigations, informed other employees of the fraud. Id. at 322. The Second Circuit held that the
information had been publicly disclosed because the other employees were under no obligation to keep
the information confidential. Id. at 323.
128. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a) (1988). For the relevant text of this provision, see supra note 107.
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1. Claim
The False Claims Act states that a claim "includes any request or
demand, whether under a contract or otherwise, for money or property
which is made to a contractor, grantee, or other recipient if the United
States Government provides any portion of the money or property which
is requested or demanded .. '. .1,29 This definition was incorporated to
clarify that claims asserted against organizations that receive federal
funding or property are included under the False Claims Act. 3 ' While
not inclusive,' this definition gives guidance concerning the type of acts
that Congress considered to be a "claim"-requests or demands for money
or property. It seems clear that an application for a grazing lease or permit
qualifies as a "request or demand" for those grazing rights. 32 Indeed, the
grazing lease can be seen as a contract with the government-the applicant
receives the exclusive right to graze some portion of federal rangeland in
consideration of the payment of grazing fees. Thus, it only remains to be
determined whether grazing rights are "money or property" for the purposes
of the False Claims Act.
Federal grazing rights satisfy this requirement. Ranchers who lease
public rangelands hold property rights that require the government to pay
just compensation if those rights are removed.' Thus, ranchers who
apply for leases are making a claim for money or property under the False
Claims Act.
Holders of permits, however, do not have absolute property rights against
the government.'34 Therefore, it is less clear whether an applicant for a
grazing permit makes a claim for money or property. Nonetheless, the
False Claims Act should also be applicable to grazing permittees. When
applying for a grazing permit, a rancher does make a claim for a type of
129. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(c) (1988).
130. S. REP. No. 345, supra note 109, at 21-22, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5286-87.
131. It would be anomalous to interpret § 3729(c) as including claims asserted against, for example,
a government contractor, but not including similar claims asserted directly against the government.
132. See, e.g., United States v. Neifert-White Co., 390 U.S. 228, 233 (1968) (upholding a claim
against a bank that had supplied false information in an application for a loan); United States v.
Alperstein, 183 F. Supp. 548, 552 (S.D. Fla. 1960) (upholding a claim against a veteran for fraudulently
applying for benefits for which he was ineligible), aff'd, 291 F.2d 455 (5th Cir. 1961); United States
v. Johnston, 138 F. Supp. 525, 528 (W.D. Okla. 1956) (upholding a claim against an Air Force dentist
who had misrepresented his qualifications in an employment application).
133. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
134. See supra note 43.
1994) 1427
Washington University Open Scholarship
1428 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
property against the government, because the permit represents a valuable
interest to the permittee. The permittee may sublease his grazing
rights, "'35 and his grazing preference is reflected in the market value of his
ranch.'36  Banks loan against the value of a grazing permit.'37  Con-
tracts transferring grazing rights, even agreements made in contravention
of BLM regulations, are enforceable. 3 Finally, the benefit is sufficiently
concrete that both the federal government and California recognize the
permittee's "possessory interest" for tax purposes.'39 These factors show
that a rancher who applies for a federal grazing permit does assert a claim
against the BLM for money or property.
Grazing leases and permits also constitute property under the False
Claims Act because they represent a claim for a service or subsidy.
Congress, in enacting the 1986 amendments to the False Claims Act,
intended to broaden the Act's scope to include fraudulent claims for
services.14° In accordance with this principle, courts have held that
applications for veteran's benefits,14' reduced postal rates, 4 1 Medicare
reimbursement,43  and government loans'" are all claims within the
meaning of the Act. Likewise, a rancher applying for a grazing lease or
permit is applying for a government service. It is well documented that the
BLM expends more to administer its federal rangeland program than it
receives in grazing fees. 45  In fact, the federal treasury receives only
slightly more than one-third of the fees remitted by public lands ranch-
ers.'46  The grazing permit functions as a subsidy for cattle ranchers.'
47
Just as a Medicare recipient or an eligible veteran receives subsidized
health care from the government, or a user of the second class mails
receives subsidized postage, a grazing permit holder receives subsidized
forage for his cattle. Therefore, when ranchers apply for a grazing permit,
135. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
136. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
137. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
138. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
139. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
140. See supra notes 109-13 and accompanying text.
141. United States v. Alperstein, 183 F. Supp. 548 (S.D. Fla. 1960), aff d, 291 F.2d 455 (5th Cir.
1961).
142. United States ex rel. Rodriguez v. Weekly Publications, 68 F. Supp. 767 (S.D.N.Y. 1946).
143. United States v. Lorenzo, 768 F. Supp. 1127 (E.D. Pa. 1991).
144. United States v. Neifert-White Co., 390 U.S. 228 (1968).
145. See supra notes 67-68 and accompanying text.
146. See supra note 67.
147. See supra notes 65-73 and accompanying text.
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they are making a claim for a service or subsidy from the government.
In determining whether a claim falls under the False Claims Act, it is
also necessary to determine whether the claim is asserted as a matter of
right. This is important because the legislative history for the 1986
amendments to the False Claims Act specifically endorses the reasoning in
United States ex rel. Rodriguez v. Weekly Publications.141 In Rodriguez,
the court held that a magazine publisher utilizing second class mail in
violation of postal regulations was making a claim against the govern-
ment.' 49 In addition to emphasizing that the reduced rate was equivalent
to a subsidy, 5' the court stressed that the publisher, by presenting
magazines for second class mailing, was, in effect, demanding "as a matter
of right that the government carry the publications through the mails at a
rate less than it was entitled to charge."'' According to the court, this
implied demand elevated the postal submission to a claim within the
meaning of the False Claims Act.' 52
Similarly, applicants for renewal of grazing permits make demands as a
matter of right. In FLPMA, Congress declared that, subject to certain
conditions, a "holder of [an] expiring permit or lease shall be given first
priority for receipt of the new permit or lease."' '53 The Taylor Act
requires the BLM to renew the permit of a permittee who otherwise
complies with the BLM's regulations and who has secured a loan with the
permit. 54  Moreover, the D.C. Circuit, in Red Canyon Sheep Co. v.
Ickes,"'55 stated that those who qualify for a preference are entitled "as
a matter of right" to the permit as against others. 5 6 Thus, in accordance
with Rodriguez, a rancher who seeks to have his grazing permit renewed
makes a demand "as a matter of right" and, therefore, makes a claim under
the False Claims Act.
148. United States ex rel. Rodriguez v. Weekly Publications, 68 F. Supp. 767 (S.D.N.Y. 1946).
See S. REP. No. 345, supra note 109, at 9 (1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5274).
149. Rodriguez, 68 F. Supp. at 770.
150. Id.
151. Id. The court cited Payne v. United States ex rel National Ry. Pub. Co., 20 App. D.C. 581,
598 (1902), cert. dismissed, 192 U.S. 857 (1904), for the proposition that a person who qualified for
use of second class mails was entitled to the rate as a matter of "positive legal right." Rodriguez, 68
F. Supp. at 770.
152. Id.
153. 43 U.S.C. § 1752(c) (1988), Accord 43 C.F.R. § 4130.2(d) (1992).
154. 43 U.S.C. § 315b (1988).
155. 98 F.2d 308 (D.C. Cir. 1938).
156. Id. at 314.
14291994]
Washington University Open Scholarship
1430 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
2. Fraudulent Claims
After establishing that applications for grazing permits or leases are
claims under the False Claims Act, it still must be determined when and if
such claims may be deemed fraudulent.
The False Claims Act gives no definition of "fraudulent" or "false," and
no comprehensive definition appears in the cases. However, the cases
generally appear to follow the common law tort rule that a fraudulent
statement must misstate the truth about a previous occurrence or a present
condition.'57 At common law, statements about the future were generally
not actionable."' 8 However, the Restatement (Second) of Torts provides:
"A representation of the maker's own intention to do or not to do a
particular thing is fraudulent if he does not have that intention."'5 9 The
accompanying comment states that this rule is applicable when a party
misrepresents his intention to fulfill an agreement, whether the intent is
actually expressed or merely implied from the agreement. 6
Although the courts have not yet encountered a claim under the False
Claims Act made on the basis of some future event, there is no logical
reason to exclude claims arising from such events from the Act's coverage.
It would be consistent with the entire purpose of the Act to hold that claims
are fraudulent when they are made on the basis of some future act that the
claimant does not intend to perform.' 6'
157. See, e.g., United States v. Neifert-White Co., 390 U.S. 228 (1968) (finding that false statements
on an application for a government loan satisfy the False Claims Act); Peterson v. Weinberger, 508 F.2d
45 (5th Cir.) (finding violation of False Claim Act where defendant had filed Medicare claims falsely
certifying that services had been performed by qualified providers), cert. denied sub nom., Peterson v.
Matthews, 423 U.S. 830 (1975); United States v. Sytch, 257 F.2d 475 (2d Cir. 1958) (finding violation
where school had filed false statement of costs with government agency).
The Restatement defines fraudulent misrepresentation as a statement made by the maker when he
"knows or believes that the matter is not as he represents it to be." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 526(a) (1977).
158. See 37 C.J.S. Fraud § 6 (1943); 37 AM. JUR. 2D Fraud & Deceit § 60 (1968).
159. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 530(1) (1977). See also 37 C.LS. Fraud § 11 (1943);
37 AM. JUR. 2D Fraud & Deceit §§ 64, 68-69 (1968).
160. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 530 cmt. c.
161. Several courts have found statements about the future to be fraudulent under other statutes in
accordance with the Restatement rule. See Durland v. United States, 161 U.S. 306, 313 (1896) (finding
mail fraud where defendant made knowingly false statements about future intentions through the mail);
United States v. Hartness, 845 F.2d 158, 161 (8th Cir.) (finding violation of 18 U.S.C.A. 1001 (1982)
when applicant for government loan deliberately overestimated projected annual income), cert. denied,
488 U.S. 925 (1988); Cashco Oil Co. v. Moses, 605 F. Supp. 70, 71 (N.D. I11. 1985) (finding that
knowingly false statements about future intentions must be proved for RICO action).
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There are two situations in which ranchers may be said to submit
fraudulent claims under the False Claims Act. The first situation may
occur when a rancher applies for renewal of an existing lease or permit.
Ranchers who apply for renewals are entitled to first priority if the rancher
"is in compliance with the [BLM] rules and regulations and the terms and
conditions in the permit or lease."'62  Thus, if a rancher applies for
renewal of her lease and she is not in compliance with her existing lease,
e.g., she has more cattle on an allotment than is permissible under her
lease, she is making a fraudulent claim against the United States under the
False Claims Act.'63 Similarly, if a rancher knowingly makes false
statements to the BLM about her compliance with the terms of an existing
permit, she makes a false statement to get a "false or fraudulent claim"
approved by the government in violation of the False Claims Act.' 64
The second situation may occur when ranchers initially apply for grazing
permits. Any permit issued by the BLM must contain grazing restrictions
on the number of livestock, the periods of use, and the amount of use
permissible. 6 By accepting the permit, the rancher agrees to abide by
its conditions. 6 6 If the rancher intended to violate these conditions at the
time the permit was issued, the rancher made a fraudulent statement to the
BLM, 167 and thus, made a false claim against the United States. 161
B. Jurisdictional Bar
It is clear that a person bringing a qui tam suit against a rancher must,
at least in part, have information that is not available to the public.' 69
The information must necessarily be acquired from another source, such as
162. 43 C.F.IL 4130.2(d)(2) (1992). See also BuREAu OF LAND MANAGEMENT, U.S. DEP'T OF THE
INTERIOR, Grazing Application, Grazing Schedule (Form 4130.1, 1992) (stating in the "terms and
conditions" that all grazing done on lands specified in the permit or lease must be in accordance with
BLM regulations).
163. See United States ex rel. Rodriguez v. Weekly Publications, 68 F. Supp. 767 (S.D.N.Y. 1946).
In Rodriguez, the defendant submitted materials to be mailed at the second class rate. Id. at 768. The
court held that this act constituted a claim that the material was eligible for that rate. Id. at 770.
Because the materials were not eligible for the second class rate, the court held that the submission was
a fraudulent claim against the United States. Id.
164. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(2) (1988).
165. 43 C.F.R. § 4130.6-1(a) (1992).
166. See 43 C.F.R. §§ 4130.2(a), 4130.6 (1992).
167. See supra notes 159-61 and accompanying text.
168. See cases cited supra note 157.
169. See supra notes 121-27 and accompanying text.
1994] 1431
Washington University Open Scholarship
1432 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
a disgruntled employee, or an independent investigation. 7 However, this
jurisdictional requirement may not be a substantial obstacle in the context
of grazing permit enforcement. Because the BLM's enforcement officers
are severely overextended, they lack information conceming possible permit
violations. Accordingly, little public information regarding specific
violations is likely to be published. In fact, concerned citizens, especially
those in the local area, can more easily acquire such information on their
own. Thus, their claims are not likely to be barred by this requirement.
C. Fines and Damages
These suits are not likely to be enormously profitable in sheer dollar
amounts. However, nonprofit environmental groups, who regularly file
citizen suits under other statutes, should find adequate incentive in the
opportunity to penalize overgrazers. In addition, there is some money to
be recovered from permit violators. The False Claims Act allows for a fine
of $5,000 to $10,000 plus treble damages arising from the fraudulent
claim.' 71 In 1991, the BLM charged damages for trespass of $9.19 per
animal unit month of forage consumed. 7 2  From the reported cases, it
appears that the BLM typically imposes trespass damages of between $500
and $1500.' However, there is no reason that damages must be limited
to these levels. In Holland Livestock Ranch v. United States,74 the Ninth
Circuit required only that damages not be based on speculation or
guesswork; the court did not require a precise estimate. 71 In addition,
if the federal government does not intervene, a qui tam plaintiff is entitled
to recoup reasonable costs and attorney fees. 176 While these damages are
not an enormous incentive for ordinary citizens, they do compensate
interested individuals for their efforts to penalize overgrazers.
170. Because public rangelands are accessible to all, a concerned individual might have the
opportunity to count the number of livestock allowed to graze on a specific portion of land. See 43
U.S.C. § 1063 (1988) (making it unlawful to prevent any person from peaceably entering on any public
land); 43 U.S.C. § 315e (1988) (stating that nothing in the Taylor Act shall be construed as restricting
"ingress or egress over the public lands in [grazing] districts for all proper and lawful purposes").
171. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a) (1988).
172. See supra note 77.
173. See, e.g., Luther Wallace Klump, 125 I.B.L.A. 170 (1993); Kent Gregerson, 101 I.B.L.A. 269
(1988).
174. 655 F.2d 1002 (9th Cir. 1981).
175. Id. at 1006.
176. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d)(4) (1988).
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IV. CONCLUSION
Overgrazing remains the primary threat to western public rangelands.
Although a variety of causes contribute to this problem, the willful
violation of grazing permits is particularly damaging. The BLM has
inadequate resources to enforce limitations on the grazing leases and
permits it issues. Qui tam actions were developed to allow private citizens
to help the government in the enforcement of the law. Thus, these actions
are uniquely adapted to help combat the overgrazing problem.
The False Claims Act allows for qui tam actions against persons who
make fraudulent claims against the government. When a rancher who is
not in compliance with his permit or lease conditions applies for a renewal,
or when a rancher initially applies for a permit or a lease intending to
violate its terms, he makes a false claim against the government. In such
circumstances, overgrazing violations may be enforced through qui tam
suits by private individuals.
Edmund C. Baird, III
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